10 Judges: estimating the ideological locations of Supreme Court justices

This program implements an ideal-point model (similar to the legislators example), estimating both the locations of the justices on a latent ideological dimension, and two parameters specific to each case (corresponding to the item difficulty and item discrimination parameters of a two-parameter IRT model).8 The data consist of the decisions of Justices Rehnquist, Stevens, O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsberg and Bryer, in that order, \(i = 1, \dots , 9\). The decisions are coded 1 for votes with the majority, and 0 for votes against the majority, and NA for abstentions.

In these models, the only observed data are votes, and the analyst wants to model those votes as a function of legislator- (\(\theta_i\)), and vote-specific (\(\alpha_i\), \(\lambda_i\)) parameters. The vote of legislator \(i\) on roll-call \(j\) (\(y_{i,j}\)) is a function of a the legislator’s ideal point (\(\theta_i\)), the vote’s difficulty parameter and the vote’s discrimination (\(\beta_j\)): \[ \begin{aligned}[t] y_{i,j} &\sim \mathsf{Bernoulli}(\pi_i) \\ \pi_i &= \frac{1}{1 + \exp(-\mu_{i,j})} \\ \mu_{i,j} &= \beta_j \theta_i - \alpha_j \end{aligned} \]

\[ \begin{aligned}[t] \beta_j &\sim \mathsf{Normal}(0, 2.5) \\ \alpha_j &\sim \mathsf{Normal}(0, 5) \\ \theta_i &\sim \mathsf{Normal}(0, 1) \\ \end{aligned} \]

To simplify the analysis, the outcomes will be aggregated to “Yes”, “No”, and missing values (which


  1. This example is derived from Simon Jackman, “Judges: estimating the ideological locations of Supreme Court justices”, BUGS Examples, 2007-07-24, URL.